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Abstract
We show that there exists an inherent tension between the goal of adversarial robustness and that of
standard generalization. Specifically, training robust models may not only be more resource-consuming,
but also lead to a reduction of standard accuracy. We demonstrate that this trade-off between the
standard accuracy of a model and its robustness to adversarial perturbations provably exists even in
a fairly simple and natural setting. These findings also corroborate a similar phenomenon observed
in practice. Further, we argue that this phenomenon is a consequence of robust classifiers learning
fundamentally different feature representations than standard classifiers. These differences, in particular,
seem to result in unexpected benefits: the representations learned by robust models tend to align better
with salient data characteristics and human perception.
1 Introduction
Deep learning models have achieved impressive performance on a number of challenging benchmarks in
computer vision, speech recognition and competitive game playing (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Graves et al.,
2013; Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016; He et al., 2015a). However, it turns out that these models are
actually quite brittle. In particular, one can often synthesize small, imperceptible perturbations of the input
data and cause the model to make highly-confident but erroneous predictions (Dalvi et al., 2004; Biggio &
Roli, 2017; Szegedy et al., 2013).
This problem of so-called adversarial examples has garnered significant attention recently and resulted
in a number of approaches both to finding these perturbations, and to training models that are robust to
them (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Nguyen et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2016;
Sharif et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016a; Evtimov et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2017). However, building such
adversarially robust models has proved to be quite challenging. In particular, many of the proposed robust
training methods were subsequently shown to be ineffective (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Athalye et al., 2018;
Uesato et al., 2018). Only recently, has there been progress towards models that achieve robustness that can
be demonstrated empirically and, in some cases, even formally verified (Madry et al., 2017; Kolter & Wong,
2017; Sinha et al., 2017; Tjeng & Tedrake, 2017; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Dvijotham et al., 2018a; Xiao
et al., 2018b).
The vulnerability of models trained using standard methods to adversarial perturbations makes it clear
that the paradigm of adversarially robust learning is different from the classic learning setting. In particular,
we already know that robustness comes at a cost. This cost takes the form of computationally expensive
training methods (more training time), but also, as shown recently in Schmidt et al. (2018), the potential
need for more training data. It is natural then to wonder: Are these the only costs of adversarial robustness?
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And, if so, once we choose to pay these costs, would it always be preferable to have a robust model instead of
a standard one? The goal of this work is to explore these questions and thus, in turn, to bring us closer to
understanding the phenomenon of adversarial robustness.
Our contributions It might be natural to expect that training models to be adversarially robust, albeit
more resource-consuming, can only improve performance in the standard classification setting. In this work,
we show, however, that the picture here is much more nuanced: these two goals might be fundamentally at
odds. Specifically, even though training models to be adversarially robust can be beneficial in the regime of
limited training data, in general, there is an inherent trade-off between the standard accuracy and adversarially
robust accuracy of a model. In fact, we show that this trade-off provably exists even in a fairly simple and
natural setting.
At the root of this trade-off is the fact that representations learned by the optimal standard and optimal
robust classifiers are fundamentally different and, interestingly, this phenomenon persists even in the limit of
infinite data. This goes against the natural expectation that given sufficient data, classic machine learning
tools would be sufficient to learn robust models and emphasizes the need for techniques specifically tailored
to the adversarially robust learning setting.
Our exploration also uncovers certain unexpected benefit of adversarially robust models. These stem from
the fact that the set of perturbations considered in robust training contains perturbations that we would
expect humans to be invariant to. Training models to be robust to this set of perturbations thus leads to
feature representations that align better with human perception, and could also pave the way towards building
models that are easier to understand. Consequently, the feature embeddings learnt by robust models yield also
clean inter-class interpolations, similar to those found by generative adversarial networks (GANs) (Goodfellow
et al., 2014b) and other generative models. This hints at the existence of a stronger connection between
GANs and adversarial robustness.
2 On the Price of Adversarial Robustness
Recall that in the canonical classification setting, the primary focus is on maximizing standard accuracy, i.e.
the performance on (yet) unseen samples from the underlying distribution. Specifically, the goal is to train
models that have low expected loss (also known as population risk):
E
(x,y)∼D
[L(x, y; θ)]. (1)
Adversarial robustness The existence of adversarial examples largely changed this picture. In particular,
there has been a lot of interest in developing models that are resistant to them, or, in other words, models
that are adversarially robust. In this context, the goal is to train models with low expected adversarial loss:
E
(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈∆
L(x+ δ, y; θ)
]
. (2)
Here, ∆ represents the set of perturbations that the adversary can apply to induce misclassification. In this
work, we focus on the case when ∆ is the set of `p-bounded perturbations, i.e. ∆ = {δ ∈ Rd | ‖δ‖p ≤ ε}. This
choice is the most common one in the context of adversarial examples and serves as a standard benchmark.
It is worth noting though that several other notions of adversarial perturbations have been studied. These
include rotations and translations (Fawzi & Frossard, 2015; Engstrom et al., 2017), and smooth spatial
deformations (Xiao et al., 2018a). In general, determining the “right” ∆ to use is a domain specific question.
Adversarial training The most successful approach to building adversarially robust models so far (Madry
et al., 2017; Kolter & Wong, 2017; Sinha et al., 2017; Raghunathan et al., 2018) was so-called adversarial
2
training (Goodfellow et al., 2014b). Adversarial training is motivated by viewing (2) as a statistical learning
question, for which we need to solve the corresponding (adversarial) empirical risk minimization problem:
min
θ
E
(x,y)∼D̂
[
max
δ∈S
L(x+ δ, y; θ)
]
.
The resulting saddle point problem can be hard to solve in general. However, it turns out to be often tractable
in practice, at least in the context of `p-bounded perturbations (Madry et al., 2017). Specifically, adversarial
training corresponds to a natural robust optimization approach to solving this problem (Ben-Tal et al., 2009).
In this approach, we repeatedly find the worst-case input perturbations δ (solving the inner maximization
problem), and then update the model parameters to reduce the loss on these perturbed inputs.
Though adversarial training is effective, this success comes with certain drawbacks. The most obvious
one is an increase in the training time (we need to compute new perturbations each parameter update step).
Another one is the potential need for more training data as shown recently in Schmidt et al. (2018). These
costs make training more demanding, but is that the whole price of being adversarially robust? In particular,
if we are willing to pay these costs: Are robust classifiers better than standard ones in every other aspect?
This is the key question that motivates our work.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the standard accuracy of models trained against an `2-bounded adversary as a
function of size of the training dataset. We observe that when training with few samples, adversarial training
has a positive effect on model generalization (especially on MNIST). However, as training data increase, the
standard accuracy of robust models drops below that of the standard model (εtrain = 0). Similar results for
`∞ trained networks are shown in Figure 6 of Appendix G.
Adversarial Training as a Form of Data Augmentation Our point of start is a popular view of
adversarial training as the “ultimate” form of data augmentation. According to this view, the adversarial
perturbation set ∆ is seen as the set of invariants that a good model should satisfy (regardless of the
adversarial robustness considerations). Thus, finding the worst-case δ corresponds to augmenting the training
data in the “most confusing” and thus also “most helpful” manner. A key implication of this view is that
adversarial training should be beneficial for the standard accuracy of a model (Torkamani & Lowd, 2013,
2014; Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Miyato et al., 2018).
Indeed, in Figure 1, we see this effect, when classifiers are trained with relatively few samples (particularly
on MNIST). In this setting, the amount of training data available is insufficient to learn a good standard
classifier and the set of adversarial perturbations used is “compatible” with the learning task. (That is, good
standard models for this task need to be also somewhat invariant to these perturbations.) In such regime,
robust training does indeed act as data augmentation, regularizing the model and leading to a better solution
(from standard accuracy point of view). (Note that this effect seems less pronounced for CIFAR-10 and
restricted ImageNet, possibly because `p-invariance is not as important for these tasks.)
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Surprisingly however, as we include more samples in the training set, this positive effect becomes less
significant (Figure 1). In fact, after some point adversarial training actually decreases the standard accuracy.
Overall, when training on the entire dataset, we observe a decline in standard accuracy as the strength of the
adversary increases (see Figure 7 of Appendix G for a plot of standard accuracy vs. ε). (Note that this still
holds if we train on batches that contain natural examples as well, as recommended by Kurakin et al. (2016a).
See Appendix B for details.) Similar effects were also observed in prior and concurrent work (Kurakin et al.,
2016b; Madry et al., 2017; Dvijotham et al., 2018b; Wong et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2018b; Su et al., 2018).
The goal of this work is to illustrate and explain the roots of this phenomenon. In particular, we would
like to understand:
Why does there seem to be a trade-off between standard and adversarially robust accuracy?
As we will show, this effect is not an artifact of our adversarial training methods but may in fact be an
inevitable consequence of different goals of adversarial robustness and standard generalization.
2.1 Adversarial robustness might be incompatible with standard accuracy
As we discussed above, we often observe that employing adversarial training leads to a decrease in a model’s
standard accuracy. In what follows, we show that this phenomenon is a manifestation of an inherent tension
between standard accuracy and adversarially robust accuracy. In particular, we present a theoretical model
that demonstrates it. In fact, this phenomenon can be illustrated in a fairly simple setting which suggests
that it is quite prevalent.
Our binary classification task Our data model consists of input-label pairs (x, y) sampled from a
distribution D as follows:
y
u.a.r∼ {−1,+1}, x1 =
{
+y, w.p. p
−y, w.p. 1− p , x2, . . . , xd+1
i.i.d∼ N (ηy, 1), (3)
where N (µ, σ2) is a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, and p ≥ 0.5. We chose η to be large
enough so that a simple classifier attains high standard accuracy (>99%) – e.g. η = Θ(1/
√
d) will suffice.
The parameter p quantifies how correlated the feature x1 is with the label. For the sake of example, we can
think of p as being 0.95. This choice is fairly arbitrary; the trade-off between standard and robust accuracy
will be qualitatively similar for any p < 1.
Standard classification is easy Note that samples from D consist of a single feature that is moderately
correlated with the label and d other features that are only very weakly correlated with it. Despite the
fact that each one of the latter type of features individually is hardly predictive of the correct label, this
distribution turns out to be fairly simple to classify from a standard accuracy perspective. Specifically, a
natural (linear) classifier
favg(x) := sign(w>unifx), where wunif :=
[
0,
1
d
, . . . ,
1
d
]
, (4)
achieves standard accuracy arbitrarily close to 100%, for d large enough. Indeed, observe that
Pr[favg(x) = y] = Pr[sign(wunifx) = y] = Pr
[
y
d
d∑
i=1
N (ηy, 1) > 0
]
= Pr
[
N
(
η,
1
d
)
> 0
]
,
which is > 99% when η ≥ 3/√d.
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Adversarially robust classification Note that in our discussion so far, we effectively viewed the average
of x2, . . . , xd+1 as a single “meta-feature” that is highly correlated with the correct label. For a standard
classifier, any feature that is even slightly correlated with the label is useful. As a result, a standard classifier
will take advantage (and thus rely on) the weakly correlated features x2, . . . , xd+1 (by implicitly pooling
information) to achieve almost perfect standard accuracy.
However, this analogy breaks completely in the adversarial setting. In particular, an `∞-bounded
adversary that is only allowed to perturb each feature by a moderate ε can effectively override the effect of the
aforementioned meta-feature. For instance, if ε = 2η, an adversary can shift each weakly-correlated feature
towards −y. The classifier would now see a perturbed input x′ such that each of the features x′2, . . . , x′d+1 are
sampled i.i.d. from N (−ηy, 1) (i.e., now becoming anti-correlated with the correct label). Thus, when ε ≥ 2η,
the adversary can essentially simulate the distribution of the weakly-correlated features as if belonging to the
wrong class.
Formally, the probability of the meta-feature correctly predicting y in this setting (4) is
min
‖δ‖∞≤ε
Pr[sign(x+ δ) = y] ≤ Pr
[
N
(
η,
1
d
)
− ε > 0
]
= Pr
[
N
(
−η, 1
d
)
> 0
]
.
As a result, the simple classifier in (4) that relies solely on these features cannot get adversarial accuracy
better than 1%.
Intriguingly, this discussion draws a distinction between robust features (x1) and non-robust features
(x2, . . . , xd+1) that arises in the adversarial setting. While the meta-feature is far more predictive of the true
label, it is extremely unreliable in the presence of an adversary. Hence, a tension between standard and
adversarial accuracy arises. Any classifier that aims for high accuracy (say > 99%) will have to heavily rely
on non-robust features (the robust feature provides only, say, 95% accuracy). However, since the non-robust
features can be arbitrarily manipulated, this classifier will inevitably have low adversarial accuracy. We make
this formal in the following theorem proved in Appendix C.
Theorem 2.1 (Robustness-accuracy trade-off). Any classifier that attains at least 1− δ standard accuracy
on D has robust accuracy at most p1−pδ against an `∞-bounded adversary with ε ≥ 2η.
This bound implies that if p < 1, as standard accuracy approaches 100% (δ → 0), adversarial accuracy
falls to 0%. As a concrete example, consider p = 0.95, for which any classifier with standard accuracy more
than 1 − δ will have robust accuracy at most 19δ1. Also it is worth noting that the theorem is tight. If
δ = 1− p, both the standard and adversarial accuracies are bounded by p which is attained by the classifier
that relies solely on the first feature. Additionally, note that compared to the scale of the features ±1, the
value of ε required to manipulate the standard classifier is very small (ε = O(η), where η = O(1/
√
d)).
On the (non-)existence of an accurate and robust classifier It might be natural to expect that in
the regime of infinite data, the standard classifier itself acts as a robust classifier. Note however, that this is
not true for the setting we analyze above. Here, the trade-off between standard and adversarial accuracy is
an inherent trait of the data distribution itself and not due to having insufficient samples. In this particular
classification task, we (implicitly) assumed that there does not exist a classifier that is both robust and very
accurate (i.e. > 99% standard and robust accuracy). Thus, for this task, any classifier that is very accurate
(including the Bayes classifier – the classifier minimizing classification error having full-information about the
distribution) will necessarily be non-robust.
This seemingly goes against the common assumption in adversarial ML that humans are such perfect robust
and accurate classifiers for standard datasets. However, note that there is no concrete evidence supporting
this assumption. In fact, humans often have far from perfect performance in vision benchmarks (Karpathy,
2011, 2014; Russakovsky et al., 2015) and are outperformed by ML models in certain tasks (He et al., 2015b;
Gastaldi, 2017). It is plausible that standard ML models are able to outperform humans in these tasks by
1Hence, any classifier with standard accuracy ≥ 99% has robust accuracy ≤ 19% and any classifier with standard accuracy
≥ 96% has robust accuracy ≤ 76%.
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relying on brittle features that humans are naturally invariant to and the observed decrease in performance
of robust models might be the manifestation of that.
2.2 The importance of adversarial training
As we have seen in the distributional model D (3), a classifier that achieves very high standard accuracy (1)
will inevitably have near-zero adversarial accuracy. This is true even when a classifier with reasonable standard
and robust accuracy exists. Hence, in an adversarial setting (2), where the goal is to achieve high adversarial
accuracy, the training procedure needs to be modified. We now make this phenomenon concrete for linear
classifiers trained using the soft-margin SVM loss. Specifically, in Appendix D we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 (Adversarial training matters). For η ≥ 4/√d and p ≤ 0.975 (the first feature is not perfect),
a soft-margin SVM classifier of unit weight norm minimizing the distributional loss achieves a standard
accuracy of > 99% and adversarial accuracy of < 1% against an `∞-bounded adversary of ε ≥ 2η. Minimizing
the distributional adversarial loss instead leads to a robust classifier that has standard and adversarial accuracy
of p against any ε < 1.
This theorem shows that if our focus is on robust models, adversarial training is necessary to achieve
non-trivial adversarial accuracy in this setting. Soft-margin SVM classifiers and the constant 0.975 are chosen
for mathematical convenience. Our proofs do not depend on them in a crucial way and can be adapted, in a
straightforward manner, to other natural settings, e.g. logistic regression.
Transferability An interesting implication of our analysis is that standard training produces classifiers
that rely on features that are weakly correlated with the correct label. This will be true for any classifier
trained on the same distribution. Hence, the adversarial examples that are created by perturbing each feature
in the direction of −y will transfer across classifiers trained on independent samples from the distribution.
This constitutes an interesting manifestation of the generally observed phenomenon of transferability (Szegedy
et al., 2013) and might hint at its origin.
Empirical examination In Section 2.1, we showed that the trade-off between standard accuracy and
robustness might be inevitable. To examine how representative our theoretical model is of real-world datasets,
we experimentally investigate this issue on MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) as it is amenable to linear classifiers.
Interestingly, we observe a qualitatively similar behavior. For instance, in Figure 5(b) in Appendix E, we see
that the standard classifier assigns weight to even weakly-correlated features. (Note that in settings with
finite training data, such brittle features could arise even from noise – see Appendix E.) The robust classifier
on the other hand does not assign any weight beyond a certain threshold. Further, we find that it is possible
to obtain a robust classifier by directly training a standard model using only features that are relatively
well-correlated with the label (without adversarial training). As expected, as more features are incorporated
into the training, the standard accuracy is improved at the cost of robustness (see Appendix E Figure 5(c)).
3 Unexpected benefits of adversarial robustness
In Section 2, we established that robust and standard models might depend on very different sets of features.
We demonstrated how this can lead to a decrease in standard accuracy for robust models. In this section, we
will argue that the representations learned by robust models can also be beneficial.
At a high level, robustness to adversarial perturbations can be viewed as an invariance property that a
model satisfies. A model that achieves small loss for all perturbations in the set ∆, will necessarily have
learned representations that are invariant to such perturbations. Thus, robust training can be viewed as
a method to embed certain invariances in a model. Since we also expect humans to be invariant to these
perturbations (by design, e.g. small `p-bounded changes of the pixels), robust models will be more aligned
with human vision than standard models. In the rest of the section, we present evidence supporting the view.
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Figure 2: Visualization of the loss gradient with respect to input pixels. Recall that these gradients highlight
the input features which affect the loss most strongly, and thus are important for the classifier’s prediction.
We observe that the gradients are significantly more interpretable for adversarially trained networks – they
align well with perceptually relevant features. In contrast, for standard networks they appear very noisy.
(For MNIST, blue and red pixels denote positive and negative gradient regions respectively. For CIFAR-10
and ImageNet, we clip gradients to within ±3 standard deviations of their mean and rescale them to lie in
the [0, 1] range.) Additional visualizations are presented in Figure 10 of Appendix G.
Loss gradients in the input space align well with human perception As a starting point, we want
to investigate which features of the input most strongly affect the prediction of the classifier both for standard
and robust models. To this end, we visualize the gradients of the loss with respect to individual features
(pixels) of the input in Figure 2. We observe that gradients for adversarially trained networks align well
with perceptually relevant features (such as edges) of the input image. In contrast, for standard networks,
these gradients have no coherent patterns and appear very noisy to humans. We want to emphasize that
no preprocessing was applied to the gradients (other than scaling and clipping for visualization). So far,
extraction of interpretable information from the gradients of standard networks has only been possible with
additional sophisticated techniques (Simonyan et al., 2013; Yosinski et al., 2015; Olah et al., 2017).
This observation effectively outlines an approach to train models that align better with human perception
by design. By encoding the correct prior into the set of perturbations ∆, adversarial training alone might be
sufficient to yield interpretable gradients. We believe that this phenomenon warrants an in-depth investigation
and we view our experiments as only exploratory.
Adversarial examples exhibit salient data characteristics Given how the gradients of standard and
robust models are concentrated on qualitatively different input features, we want to investigate how the
adversarial examples of these models appear visually. To find adversarial examples, we start from a given test
image and apply Projected Gradient Descent (PGD; a standard first-order optimization method) to find the
image of highest loss within an `p-ball of radius ε around the original image2. This procedure will change the
pixels that are most influential for a particular model’s predictions and thus hint towards how the model is
making its predictions.
The resulting visualizations are presented in Figure 3 (details in Appendix A). Surprisingly, we can observe
that adversarial perturbations for robust models tend to produce salient characteristics of another class. In
fact, the corresponding adversarial examples for robust models can often be perceived as samples from that
class. This behavior is in stark contrast to standard models, for which adversarial examples appear to humans
as noisy variants of the input image.
2To allow for significant image changes, we will use much larger values of ε than those used during training.
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Figure 3: Visualizing large-ε adversarial examples for standard and robust (`2/`∞-adversarial training)
models. We construct these examples by iteratively following the (negative) loss gradient while staying with
`2-distance of ε from the original image. We observe that the images produced for robust models effectively
capture salient data characteristics and appear similar to examples of a different class. (The value of ε is
equal for all models and much larger than the one used for training.) Additional examples are visualized in
Figure 8 and 9 of Appendix G.
These findings provide additional evidence that adversarial training does not necessarily lead to gradient
obfuscation (Athalye et al., 2018). Following the gradient changes the image in a meaningful way and
(eventually) leads to images of different classes. Hence, the robustness of these models does not stem from
having gradients that are ill-suited for first-order methods.
Smooth cross-class interpolations via gradient descent By linearly interpolating between the original
image and the image produced by PGD we can produce a smooth, “perceptually plausible” interpolation
between classes (Figure 4). Such interpolation have thus far been restricted to generative models such as
GANs (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) and VAEs (Kingma & Welling, 2013), involved manipulation of learned
representations (Upchurch et al., 2016), and hand-designed methods (Suwajanakorn et al., 2015; Kemelmacher-
Shlizerman, 2016). In fact, we conjecture that the similarity of these inter-class trajectories to GAN
interpolations is not a coincidence. We postulate that the saddle point problem that is key in both these
approaches may be at the root of this effect. We hope that future research will investigate this connection
further and explore how to utilize the loss landscape of robust models as an alternative method to smoothly
interpolate between classes.
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Figure 4: Interpolation between original image and large-ε adversarial example as in Figure 3.
4 Related work
Due to the large body of related work, we will only focus on the most relevant studies here and defer the full
discussion to Appendix F. Fawzi et al. (2018b) prove upper bounds on the robust of classifiers and exhibit
a standard vs. robust accuracy trade-off for a specific classifier families on a synthetic task. Their setting
also (implicitly) utilizes the notion of robust and non-robust features, however these features have small
magnitude rather than weak correlation. Ross & Doshi-Velez (2017) propose regularizing the gradient of the
classifier with respect to its input. They find that the resulting classifiers have more interpretable gradients
and targeted adversarial examples resemble the target class for digit and character recognition tasks. There
has been recent of work proving upper bounds on classifier robustness (Schmidt et al., 2018; Fawzi et al.,
2018a). However, this work is orthogonal to ours as it does not differentiate standard and robust classifiers.
5 Conclusions and future directions
In this work, we show that the goal of adversarially robust generalization might fundamentally be at odds
with that of standard generalization. Specifically, we identify an inherent trade-off between the standard
accuracy and adversarial robustness of a model, that provably manifests even in simple settings. This trade-off
stems from intrinsic differences between the feature representations learned by standard and robust models.
Our analysis also explains the drop in standard accuracy observed when employing adversarial training in
practice. Moreover, it emphasizes the need to develop robust training methods, since robustness is unlikely
to arise as a consequence of standard training.
We discover that even though adversarial robustness comes at a price, it has some unexpected benefits.
Robust models learn meaningful feature representations that align well with salient data characteristics. The
root of this phenomenon is that the set of adversarial perturbations encodes some prior for human perception.
Thus, classifiers that are robust to these perturbations are also necessarily invariant to input modifications
that we expect humans to be invariant to. We demonstrate a striking consequence of this phenomenon:
robust models yield clean feature interpolations similar to those obtained from generative models such as
GANs (Goodfellow et al., 2014b). This emphasizes the possibility of a stronger connection between GANs
and adversarial robustness.
Finally, our findings show that the interplay between adversarial robustness and standard classification
might be more nuanced that one might expect. This motivates further work to fully undertand the relative
costs and benefits of each of these notions.
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A Experimental setup
A.1 Datasets
We perform our experimental analysis on the MNIST (LeCun et al., 2010), CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton,
2009) and (restricted) ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) datasets. For the ImageNet dataset, adversarial training
is significantly harder since the classification problem is challenging by itself and standard classifiers are
already computationally expensive to train. We thus restrict our focus to a smaller subset of the dataset. We
group together a subset of existing, semantically similar ImageNet classes into 8 different super-classes, as
shown in Table 1. We train and evaluate only on examples corresponding to these classes.
Table 1: Classes used in the Restricted ImageNet model. The class ranges are inclusive.
Class Corresponding ImageNet Classes
“Dog” 151 to 268
“Cat” 281 to 285
“Frog” 30 to 32
“Turtle” 33 to 37
“Bird” 80 to 100
“Primate” 365 to 382
“Fish” 389 to 397
“Crab” 118 to 121
“Insect” 300 to 319
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A.2 Models
• Binary MNIST (Appendix E): We train a linear classifier with parameters w ∈ R784, b ∈ R on a binary
subtask of MNIST (labels −1 and +1 correspond to images labelled as “5” and “7” respectively). We
use the cross-entropy loss and perform 100 epochs of gradient descent in training.
• MNIST: We use the simple convolution architecture from the TensorFlow tutorial (TFM, 2017)3.
• CIFAR-10: We consider a standard ResNet model (He et al., 2015a). It has 4 groups of residual layers
with filter sizes (16, 16, 32, 64) and 5 residual units each4.
• Restricted ImageNet: We use a ResNet-50 (He et al., 2015a) architecture using the code from the
tensorpack repository (Wu et al., 2016). We do not modify the model architecture, and change the
training procedure only by changing the number of examples per “epoch” from 1,280,000 images to
76,800 images.
A.3 Adversarial training
We perform adversarial training to train robust classifiers following Madry et al. (2017). Specifically, we
train against a projected gradient descent (PGD) adversary, starting from a random initial perturbation of
the training data. We consider adversarial perturbations in `p norm where p = {2,∞}. Unless otherwise
specified, we use the values of ε provided in Table 2 to train/evaluate our models (pixel values in [0, 1]).
Table 2: Value of ε used for adversarial training/evaluation of each dataset and `p-norm.
Adversary Binary MNIST MNIST CIFAR-10 Restricted Imagenet
`∞ 0.2 0.3 4/255 0.005
`2 - 1.5 0.314 1
A.4 Adversarial examples for large ε
The images we generated for Figure 3 were allowed a much larger perturbation from the original sample
in order to produce visible changes to the images. These values are listed in Table 3. Since these levels of
Table 3: Value of ε used for large-ε adversarial examples of Figure 3.
Adversary MNIST CIFAR-10 Restricted Imagenet
`∞ 0.3 0.125 0.25
`2 4 4.7 40
perturbations would allow to truly change the class of the image, training against such strong adversaries
would be impossible. Still, we observe that smaller values of ε suffice to ensure that the models rely on the
most robust features.
3https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge/
4https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge/
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Table 4: Standard and robust accuracy corresponding to robust training with half natural and half adversarial
samples. The accuracies correspond to standard, robust and half-half training.
Standard Accuracy Robust Accuracy
Norm ε Standard Half-half Robust Standard Half-half Robust
M
N
IS
T
`∞
0 99.31% - - - - -
0.1 99.31% 99.43% 99.36% 29.45% 95.29% 95.05%
0.2 99.31% 99.22% 98.99% 0.05% 90.79% 92.86%
0.3 99.31% 99.17% 97.37% 0.00% 89.51% 89.92%
`2
0 99.31% - - - - -
0.5 99.31% 99.35% 99.41% 94.67% 97.60% 97.70%
1.5 99.31% 99.29% 99.24% 56.42% 87.71% 88.59%
2.5 99.31% 99.12% 97.79% 46.36% 60.27% 63.73%
C
IF
A
R
10
`∞
0 92.20% - - - - -
2/255 92.20% 90.13% 89.64% 0.99% 69.10% 69.92%
4/255 92.20% 88.27% 86.54% 0.08% 55.60% 57.79%
8/255 92.20% 84.72% 79.57% 0.00% 37.56% 41.93%
`2
0 92.20% - - - - -
20/255 92.20% 92.04% 91.77% 45.60% 83.94% 84.70%
80/255 92.20% 88.95% 88.38% 8.80% 67.29% 68.69%
320/255 92.20% 81.74% 75.75% 3.30% 34.45% 39.76%
B Mixing natural and adversarial examples in each batch
In order to make sure that the standard accuracy drop in Figure 7 is not an artifact of only training on
adversarial examples, we experimented with including unperturbed examples in each training batch, following
the recommendation of (Kurakin et al., 2016a). We found that while this slightly improves the standard
accuracy of the classifier, it usually decreases robust accuracy by a roughly proportional amount, see Table 4.
C Proof of Theorem 2.1
The main idea of the proof is that an adversary with ε = 2η is able to change the distribution of features
x2, . . . , xd+1 to reflect a label of −y instead of y by subtracting εy from each variable. Hence any information
that is used from these features to achieve better standard accuracy can be used by the adversary to reduce
adversarial accuracy. We define G+ to be the distribution of x2, . . . , xd+1 when y = +1 and G− to be that
distribution when y = −1. We will consider the setting where ε = 2η and fix the adversary that replaces xi by
xi − yε for each i ≥ 2. This adversary is able to change G+ to G− in the adversarial setting and vice-versa.
Consider any classifier f(x) that maps an input x to a class in {−1,+1}. Let us fix the probability that
this classifier predicts class +1 for some fixed value of x1 and distribution of x2, . . . , xd+1. Concretely, we
define pij to be the probability of predicting +1 given that the first feature has sign i and the rest of the
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features are distributed according to Gj . Formally,
p++ = Pr
x2,...,d+1∼G+
(f(x) = +1 | x1 = +1),
p+− = Pr
x2,...,d+1∼G−
(f(x) = +1 | x1 = +1),
p−+ = Pr
x2,...,d+1∼G+
(f(x) = +1 | x1 = −1),
p−− = Pr
x2,...,d+1∼G−
(f(x) = +1 | x1 = −1).
Using these definitions, we can express the standard accuracy of the classifier as
Pr(f(x) = y) = Pr(y = +1) (p · p++ + (1− p) · p−+)
+ Pr(y = −1) (p · (1− p−−) + (1− p) · (1− p+−))
=
1
2
(p · p++ + (1− p) · p−+ + p · (1− p−−) + (1− p) · (1− p+−))
=
1
2
(p · (1 + p++ − p−−) + (1− p) · (1 + p−+ − p+−))) .
Similarly, we can express the accuracy of this classifier against the adversary that replaces G+ with G− (and
vice-versa) as
Pr(f(xadv) = y) = Pr(y = +1) (p · p+− + (1− p) · p−−)
+ Pr(y = −1) (p · (1− p−+) + (1− p) · (1− p++))
=
1
2
(p · p+− + (1− p) · p−− + p · (1− p−+) + (1− p) · (1− p++))
=
1
2
(p · (1 + p+− − p−+) + (1− p) · (1 + p−− − p++))) .
For convenience we will define a = 1− p++ + p−− and b = 1− p−+ + p+−. Then we can rewrite
standard accuracy :
1
2
(p(2− a) + (1− p)(2− b))
= 1− 1
2
(pa+ (1− p)b),
adversarial accuracy :
1
2
((1− p)a+ pb).
We are assuming that the standard accuracy of the classifier is at least 1− δ for some small δ. This implies
that
1− 1
2
(pa+ (1− p)b) ≥ 1− δ =⇒ pa+ (1− p)b ≤ 2δ.
Since pij are probabilities, we can guarantee that a ≥ 0. Moreover, since p ≥ 0.5, we have p/(1− p) ≥ 1. We
use these to upper bound the adversarial accuracy by
1
2
((1− p)a+ pb) ≤ 1
2
(
(1− p) p
2
(1− p)2 a+ pb
)
=
p
2(1− p) (pa+ (1− p)b)
≤ p
1− pδ.
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D Proof of Theorem 2.2
We consider the problem of fitting the distribution D of (3) by using a standard soft-margin SVM classifier.
Specifically, this can be formulated as:
min
w
E
[
max(0, 1− yw>x)]+ 1
2
λ‖w‖22 (5)
for some value of λ. We will assume that we tune λ such that the optimal solution w∗ has `2-norm of 1. This
is without much loss of generality since our proofs can be adapted to the general case. We will refer to the
first term of (5) as the margin term and the second term as the regularization term.
First we will argue that, due to symmetry, the optimal solution will assign equal weight to all the features
xi for i = 2, . . . , d+ 1.
Lemma D.1. Consider an optimal solution w∗ to the optimization problem (5). Then,
w∗i = w
∗
j ∀ i, j ∈ {2, ..., d+ 1}.
Proof. Assume that ∃ i, j ∈ {2, ..., d+ 1} such that w∗i 6= w∗j . Since the distribution of xi and xj are identical,
we can swap the value of wi and wj , to get an alternative set of parameters wˆ that has the same loss function
value (wˆj = wi, wˆi = wj , wˆk = wk for k 6= i, j).
Moreover, since the margin term of the loss is convex in w, using Jensen’s inequality, we get that averaging
w∗ and wˆ will not increase the value of that margin term. Note, however, that ‖w∗+wˆ2 ‖2 < ‖w∗‖2, hence the
regularization loss is strictly smaller for the average point. This contradicts the optimality of w∗.
Since every optimal solution will assign equal weight to all xi for k ≥ 2, we can replace these features by
their sum (and divide by
√
d for convenience). We will define
z =
1√
d
d+1∑
i=2
xi,
which, by the properties of the normal distribution, is distributed as
z ∼ N (yη
√
d, 1).
By assigning a weight of v to that combined feature the optimal solutions can be parametrized as
w>x = w1x1 + vz,
where the regularization term of the loss is λ(w21 + v2)/2.
Recall that our chosen value of η is 4/
√
d, which implies that the contribution of vz is distributed normally
with mean 4yv and variance v2. By the concentration of the normal distribution, the probability of vz being
larger than v is large. We will use this fact to show that the optimal classifier will assign on v at least as
much weight as it assigns on w1.
Lemma D.2. Consider the optimal solution (w∗1 , v∗) of the problem (5). Then
v∗ ≥ 1√
2
.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that v∗ < 1/
√
2. Then, with probability at least 1− p, the first
feature predicts the wrong label and without enough weight, the remaining features cannot compensate for it.
Concretely,
E[max(0, 1− yw>x)] ≥ (1− p) E [max (0, 1 + w1 −N (4v, v2))]
≥ (1− p) E
[
max
(
0, 1 +
1√
2
−N
(
4√
2
,
1
2
))]
> (1− p) · 0.016.
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We will now show that a solution that assigns zero weight on the first feature (v = 1 and w1 = 0), achieves
a better margin loss.
E[max(0, 1− yw>x)] = E [max (0, 1−N (4, 1))]
< 0.0004.
Hence, as long as p ≤ 0.975, this solution has a smaller margin loss than the original solution. Since both
solutions have the same norm, the solution that assigns weight only on v is better than the original solution
(w∗1 , v
∗), contradicting its optimality.
We have established that the learned classifier will assign more weight to v than w1. Since z will be at
least y with large probability, we will show that the behavior of the classifier depends entirely on z.
Lemma D.3. The standard accuracy of the soft-margin SVM learned for problem (5) is at least 99%.
Proof. By Lemma D.2, the classifier predicts the sign of w1x1 + vz where vz ∼ N (4yv, v2) and v ≥ 1/
√
2.
Hence with probability at least 99%, vzy > 1/
√
2 ≥ w1 and thus the predicted class is y (the correct class)
independent of x1.
We can utilize the same argument to show that an adversary that changes the distribution of z has
essentially full control over the classifier prediction.
Lemma D.4. The adversarial accuracy of the soft-margin SVM learned for (5) is at most 1% against an
`∞-bounded adversary of ε = 2η.
Proof. Observe that the adversary can shift each feature xi towards y by 2η. This will cause z to be distributed
as
zadv ∼ N (−yη
√
d, 1).
Therefore with probability at least 99%, vyz < −y ≤ −w1 and the predicted class will be −y (wrong class)
independent of x1.
It remains to show that adversarial training for this classification task with ε > 2η will results in a classifier
that has relies solely on the first feature.
Lemma D.5. Minimizing the adversarial variant of the loss (5) results in a classifier that assigns 0 weight
to features xi for i ≥ 2.
Proof. The optimization problem that adversarial training solves is
min
w
max
‖δ‖∞≤ε
E
[
max(0, 1− yw>(x+ δ))]+ 1
2
λ‖w‖22,
which is equivalent to
min
w
E
[
max(0, 1− yw>x+ ε‖w‖1)
]
+
1
2
λ‖w‖22.
Consider any optimal solution w for which wi > 0 for some i > 2. The contribution of terms depending on
wi to 1− yw>x+ ε‖w‖1 is a normally-distributed random variable with mean 2η − ε ≤ 0. Since the mean is
non-positive, setting wi to zero can only decrease the margin term of the loss. At the same time, setting wi
to zero strictly decreases the regularization term, contradicting the optimality of w.
Clearly, such a classifier will have standard and adversarial accuracy of p against any ε < 1 since such a
value of ε is not sufficient to change the sign of the first feature. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
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E Robustness-accuracy trade-off: An empirical examination
Our theoretical analysis shows that there is an inherent tension between standard accuracy and adversarial
robustness. At the core of this trade-off is the concept of robust and non-robust features. We now investigate
whether this notion arises experimentally by studying a dataset that is amenable to linear classifiers,
MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) (details in Appendix A).
Recall the goal of standard classification for linear classifiers is to predict accurately, i.e. y = sign(w>x).
Hence the correlation of a feature i with the true label, computed as |E[yxi]|, quantifies how useful this
feature is for classification. In the adversarial setting, against an ε `∞-bounded adversary we need to ensure
that y = sign(w>x− εy‖w‖1). In that case we roughly expect a feature i to be helpful if |E[yxi]| ≥ ε.
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Figure 5: Analysis of linear classifier trained on a binary MNIST task (5 vs. 7). (Details in Appendix
Table 5.) (a) Visualization of network weights per input feature. (b) Comparison of feature-label correlation
to the weight assigned to the feature by each network. Adversarially trained networks put weights only on a
small number of strongly-correlated or “robust” features. (c) Performance of a model trained using standard
training only on the most robust features. Specifically, we sort features based on decreasing correlation with
the label and train using only the most correlated ones. Beyond a certain threshold, we observe that as more
non-robust or (weakly correlated) features are available to the model, the standard accuracy increases at the
cost of robustness.
This calculation suggests that in the adversarial setting, there is an implicit threshold on feature correlations
imposed by the threat model (the perturbation allowed to the adversary). While standard models may utilize
all features with non-zero correlations, a robust model cannot rely on features with correlation below this
threshold. In Figure 5(b), we visualize the correlation of each pixel (feature) in the MNIST dataset along with
the learned weights of the standard and robust classifiers. As expected, we see that the standard classifier
assigns weights even to weakly-correlated pixels so as to maximize prediction confidence. On the other hand,
the robust classifier does not assign any weight below a certain correlation threshold which is dictated by the
adversary’s strength (ε) (Figures 5(a, b))
Interestingly, the standard model assigns non-zero weight even to very weakly correlated pixels (Figure 5(a)).
In settings with finite training data, such non-robust features could arise from noise. (For instance, in N
tosses of an unbiased coin, the expected imbalance between heads and tails is O(
√
N) with high probability.)
A standard classifier would try to take advantage of even this “hallucinated” information by assigning non-zero
weights to these features.
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E.1 An alternative path to robustness?
The analysis above highlights an interesting trade-off between the predictive power of a feature and its
vulnerability to adversarial perturbations. This brings forth the question – Could we use these insights
to train robust classifiers with standard methods (i.e. without performing adversarial training)? As a first
step, we train a (standard) linear classifier on MNIST utilizing input features (pixels) that lie above a given
correlation threshold (see Figure 5(c)). As expected, as more non robust features are incorporated in training,
the standard accuracy increases at the cost of robustness. Further, we observe that a standard classifier
trained in this manner using few robust features attains better robustness than even adversarial training.
This results suggest a more direct (and potentially better) method of training robust networks in certain
settings.
F Additional related work
Fawzi et al. (2016) derive parameter-dependent bounds on the robustness of any fixed classifier. Our results
focus on the statistical setting itself and provide lower bounds for all classifiers learned in this setting.
Wang et al. (2017) analyze the adversarial robustness of nearest neighbor classifiers. Instead we focus on
lower bounds that are inherent to the statistical setting itself and apply to all classifiers.
Schmidt et al. (2018) study the generalization aspect of adversarially robustness. They show that the
number of samples needed to achieve adversarially robust generalization is polynomially larger in the dimension
than the number of samples needed to ensure standard generalization. In the limit of infinite samples, a
simple linear classifier can achieve perfect standard and adversarial accuracy. In contrast, our results are
orthogonal and capture the optimization aspect of the problem, persisting in the limit of infinite data. We
show that fundamentally different classifier are needed to achieve high accuracy in the adversarial setting.
Gilmer et al. (2018) demonstrate a setting where even a small amount of standard error implies that most
points provably have a misclassified point close to them. In this setting, achieving perfect standard accuracy
(easily achieved by a simple classifier) is sufficient to achieve perfect adversarial robustness. In contrast, our
work focuses on a setting where adversarial training (provably) matters and there exists a trade-off between
standard and adversarial accuracy.
Xu & Mannor (2012) explore the connection between robustness and generalization, showing that, in a
certain sense, robustness can imply generalization. This direction is orthogonal to our, since we work in the
limit of infinite data, optimizing the distributional loss directly.
Fawzi et al. (2018a) prove lower bounds on the robustness of any classifier based on certain generative
assumptions. Since these bounds apply to all classifiers, independent of architecture and training procedure,
they fail to capture the situation we face in practice where robust optimization can significantly improve the
adversarial robustness of standard classifiers (Madry et al., 2017; Kolter & Wong, 2017; Raghunathan et al.,
2018; Sinha et al., 2017).
A recent work (Bubeck et al., 2018) turns out to (implicitly) rely on the distinction between robust and
non-robust features in constructing a distribution for which adversarial robustness is hard from a different,
computational point of view.
Goodfellow et al. (2014b) observed that adversarial training results in feature weights that depend on
fewer input features (similar to Figure 5(a)). Additionally, it has been observed that for naturally trained
RBF classifiers on MNIST, targeted adversarial attacks resemble images of the target class (Goodfellow,
2015).
Su et al. (2018) empirically observe a similar trade-off between the accuracy and robustness of standard
models across different deep architectures on ImageNet.
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Table 5: Comparison of performance of linear classifiers trained on a binary MNIST dataset with standard
and adversarial training. The performance of both models is evaluated in terms of standard and adversarial
accuracy. Adversarial accuracy refers to the percentage of examples that are correctly classified after being
perturbed by the adversary. Here, we use an `∞ threat model with ε = 0.20 (with images scaled to have
coordinates in the range [0, 1]).
Standard Accuracy (%) Adversarial Accuracy (%) ‖w‖1Train Test Train Test
Standard Training 98.38 92.10 13.69 14.95 41.08
Adversarial Training 94.05 70.05 76.05 74.65 13.69
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Figure 6: Comparison of standard accuracies of models trained against an `∞-bounded adversary as a function
of the size of the training dataset. We observe that in the low-data regime, adversarial training has an
effect similar to data augmentation and helps with generalization in certain cases (particularly on MNIST).
However, in the limit of sufficient training data, we see that the standard accuracy of robust models is less
than that of the standard model (εtrain = 0), which supports the theoretical analysis in Section 2.1.
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Figure 7: Standard test accuracy of adversarially trained classifiers. The adversary used during training is
constrained within some `p-ball of radius εtrain (details in Appendix A). We observe a consistent decrease in
accuracy as the strength of the adversary increases.
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Figure 8: Large-ε adversarial examples, bounded in `∞-norm, similar to those in Figure 3. (Lower ImageNet
resolution due to file size constraints.)
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Figure 9: Large-ε adversarial examples, bounded in `2-norm, similar to those in Figure 3. (Lower ImageNet
resolution due to file size constraints.)
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Figure 10: Visualization of the gradient of the loss with respect to input features (pixels) for standard and
adversarially trained networks for 10 randomly chosen samples, similar to those in Figure 2. Gradients are
significantly more interpretable for adversarially trained networks – they align well with perceptually relevant
features. For MNIST, blue and red pixels denote positive and negative gradient regions respectively. For
CIFAR10 and Restricted ImageNet we clip pixel to 3 standard deviations and scale to [0, 1]. (Lower ImageNet
resolution due to file size constraints.)
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